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The Chief Marketing Officer Matters!
Marketing academics and practitioners alike remain unconvinced about the chief marketing officer’s (CMO’s)
performance implications. Whereas some studies propose that firms benefit financially from having a CMO in the
C-suite, other studies conclude that the CMO has little or no effect on firm performance. Accordingly, there have been
strong calls for additional academic research regarding the CMO’s performance implications. In response to these
calls, the authors employ model specifications with varying identifying assumptions (i.e., rich data models, unobserved
effects models, instrumental variable models, and panel internal instruments models) and use data from up to 155
publicly traded firms over a 12-year period (2000–2011) to find that firms can indeed expect to benefit financially from
having a CMO at the strategy table. Specifically, their findings suggest that the performance (measured in terms of
Tobin’s q) of the sample firms that employ a CMO is, on average, approximately 15% greater than that of the sample
firms that do not employ a CMO. This result is robust to the type of model specification used. Marketing academics and
practitioners should find the results intriguing given the existing uncertainty surrounding the CMO’s performance
implications. The study also contributes to the methodology literature by collating diverse empirical model specifications
that can be used to model causal effects with observational data into a coherent and comprehensive framework.
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In 2008, Nath and Mahajan reported that “[Chief market-ing officer] presence in the Top Management Team(TMT) has neither a positive nor a negative impact on
firm performance” (p. 65). In the words of Barta (2011),
this finding “has caused quite a stir [among marketers]”
because “firms with a CMO on the management team are
not more successful than firms without a CMO.” Moreover,
Frazier (2007, p. 3)1 urged CMOs to “hide this publication”
because they are being “rapped for having zero impact.” In
short, Nath and Mahajan’s (2008; hereinafter N&M) (lack
of) findings have made many marketers nervous (also see
Shoebridge 2007; Simms 2008). Yet their work has raised
an important question: Do CMOs matter?
There is some evidence that suggests that CMOs should
positively influence firm performance. For example, using
data from 1987–1991 (in contrast, N&M use 2000–2004
data), Weinzimmer et al. (2003) find a positive correlation
between CMO presence and sales growth. It is also widely
believed that CMO presence raises the importance of mar-
keting in the C-suite, which in turn should bring the cus-
tomer to the boardroom and thereby improve firm perfor-
mance (e.g., Kerin 2005; McGovern et al. 2004). Moreover,
using an event study of CMO announcements, Boyd,
Chandy, and Cunha (2010) find that the impact of CMOs on
firm performance is contingent on the managerial discretion
available to them. In addition, using the same sample as in
their 2008 study, Nath and Mahajan (2011) report that pow-
erful CMOs have a positive impact on sales growth.
However, researchers still seem unconvinced about the
CMO’s performance implications, as evidenced by their
strong calls for additional research. For example, Boyd,
Chandy, and Cunha (2010, p. 1174) assert that “the CMO
remains a rather enigmatic creature in academic literature”
and “the scarcity of … research … is lamentable.” Simi-
larly, Nath and Mahajan (2011, p. 74) urge for additional
research to “shed further light on the issue of CMO pres-
ence.” Moreover, in summarizing the findings from a recent
CMO survey, Moorman (2013) reports that demonstrating
the value of marketing remains a general challenge for
CMOs. Indeed, approximately 66% of the CMOs surveyed
state that they are experiencing pressure from their chief
executive officer (CEO) or board to prove the value of mar-
keting. Moreover, due to their nonfindings regarding
CMOs’ performance implications, N&M is still oft-cited in
the media (e.g., Whitler 2013).
Against this backdrop, we build on N&M’s work and
seek a more comprehensive examination than what is avail-
able in the literature to model the causal effect of CMO
1It seems that Frazier (2007) had access to the prepublication
version of Nath and Mahajan (2008).
presence on firm performance. Specifically, using N&M’s
research as a starting point, we extend their work in three
important directions:
1. Time horizon: N&M included five years of data in their
study. Considering that executives’ performance effects
take time to manifest (e.g., Hambrick and Fukutomi 1991;
Miller and Shamsie 2001), we extend N&M’s sample by
seven years (i.e., for a total of 12 years [2000–2011] vs. five
years [2000–2004]).
2. Industries. N&M included a wide range of industries in
their data set but excluded certain others (e.g., Food and
Kindred Products [e.g., General Mills]; Transportation
Equipment [e.g., Ford Motor Co.]; Miscellaneous Manufac-
turing Industries [e.g., Mattel, Inc.]). We include these addi-
tional industries in our analysis.
3. Model. We consider several econometric extensions over
N&M. First, N&M employed between-effects regression
and, thus, did not exploit the panel structure of their data.
For relatively short time series (five years for N&M), using
a between-effects model might be appropriate; however,
because we include considerably more years in some of our
samples, we explicitly exploit the panel structure by includ-
ing time and firm effects in our analyses, which corrects for
common unobserved time shocks and unobserved time-
invariant firm-specific factors, respectively. Second, on the
basis of results from a residual test, N&M treated CMO
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presence as exogenous; however, CMO presence is likely
the result of a strategic firm decision, and treating CMO
presence as an exogenous regressor might result in incon-
sistent estimates. We address the potentially endogeneous
CMO effect by (a) exploiting the panel structure of the data
and (b) using instrumental variables (IVs).
Our results are promising and suggest that CMO presence
causally influences firm performance. As Table 1 shows, we
first replicated N&M as closely as possible using the between-
effects model and data similar to N&M (Study 1a); as one
would expect, doing so yielded the familiar (non)results.
Building on N&M, in Study 1b, we estimated additional mod-
els other than the between-effects model; the results reveal a
positive and significant CMO effect in IV models that cor-
rect for the endogeneity of CMO presence. We then added
additional firms/industries (Study 2) and find a positive and
significant CMO effect across all models except the
between-effects model. Next, in Study 3, we added several
years to our initial sample (i.e., 2000–2011 vs. 2000–2004),
and the results again reveal a positive and significant CMO
effect in all but the between-effects model. Finally, in Study
4, we added additional industries and years to our initial
sample; the CMO effect was again positive and significant
in all models but the between-effects model.
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Notes: In Study 1a, we attempted to replicate N&M as closely as possible. R&D = research and development, OLS = ordinary least squares,
DV = dependent variable, and 2SLSRE = two-stage least-squares random effects.
Thus, our findings suggest that firms can indeed expect
to benefit financially from having a CMO at the strategy
table. More specifically, our data and analyses suggest that
firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s q) for firms with a CMO is
approximately 15% better than that of firms without a
CMO. The positive and significant effect of CMO presence
is confirmed when we use excess stock returns (i.e.,
Jensen’s a) as an alternate performance metric.
Beyond the substantive insight that CMOs provide
value, our article also makes methodological contributions.
Recognizing the nature of our data (i.e., secondary data on a
large number of firms over several years), we identify and
describe in detail four observational data modeling
approaches that could be adopted to study complex market-
ing strategy phenomena such as the CMO’s performance
implications: (1) rich data models, (2) unobserved effects
models, (3) IV models, and (4) panel internal instruments
models. We hope that our discussion will encourage readers
to see themselves as regression engineers—that is, under-
stand the meaning of the model identifying assumptions—
as opposed to “regression mechanics”—that is, estimate a
large number of models and report the best results (Angrist
and Pischke 2009, p. 28).
In what follows, we first briefly revisit N&M. We then
discuss our modeling framework, describe our data and
samples, and present our findings. We conclude with a dis-
cussion of our findings and the limitations of our research.
Background
We begin by providing the relevant aspects of N&M’s study
and then outline how we build on their research. N&M
explore two related research questions: (1) What organiza-
tional factors are associated with CMO presence in TMTs?
(2) Does CMO presence affect firm performance? They
find that several firm factors such as the level of innovative-
ness (i.e., research and development [R&D] to sales ratio)
and differentiation (i.e., advertising to sales ratio) are asso-
ciated with the likelihood of CMO presence in the TMT.
They also find that CMO presence has no statistical effect
on firm performance, neither by itself nor when analyzed
jointly with the various firm factors (e.g., interactions
between CMO presence and innovativeness). This nonfind-
ing regarding the CMO’s performance implications forms
the crux of our research.
Over five years (2000–2004), N&M observed 167 firms
from a cross section of industries. They included all firms
from the Compustat database with sales of at least $250
million in 2002, the midpoint of their observation period.
From this set, they retained only firms without missing data
on variables such as advertising and R&D as well as their
two dependent variables, Tobin’s q and sales growth. An
executive listed in the TMT with the term “marketing” in
his or her title implied CMO presence. As we discuss in our
“Samples and Measures” section, we carefully followed
N&M’s data collection approach. We note that, in addition
to Tobin’s q and sales growth, we assess the CMO’s impact
on excess stock return (i.e., Jensen’s a) and firm systematic
and idiosyncratic risk.
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Model Specification and
Identification
Our primary objective is to establish the causal link
between CMO presence or absence (simply referred to as
“CMO presence” hereinafter) and firm performance. One
might think that a simple model, such as that shown in
Equation 1, in which one regresses firm performance on the
dummy variable indicating CMO presence, would estimate
this effect:
(1)                            FPit = b0 + b1CMOit + it,
where FPit indicates the firm performance of firm i in year t,
CMOit = 1 if firm i had a CMO during year t and 0 otherwise,
and the error term it represents unexplained variation in FPit.
However, this simple model suffers from serious limita-
tions. For example, performance is driven by many other
variables, such as advertising spending and organizational
culture, and these other variables might also influence
CMO presence. Information on these potentially important
variables is usually not available; it does not seem to be
available in our data, in which, for example, we observe
advertising spending but not organizational culture. Thus,
an omitted variable bias exists that may result in issues of
endogeneity involving the CMO presence variable (e.g.,
Wooldridge 2002). This omitted variable bias also emanates
from the recognition that CMO presence is likely based on
a (nonrandom) strategic decision of a firm to maximize its
performance; that is, firms hire a CMO because they
believe that the CMO will help improve performance. Thus,
one would need information on all input variables that go
into the strategic CMO presence decision to correct for
potential biases introduced by the nonrandom nature of
CMO presence. However, because information on all such
input variables is usually not available—it is not in our
case—the belief that CMO presence is based on a strategic
firm decision again induces endogeneity concerns due to
omitted variables. Thus, the causal effect of CMO presence
on firm performance is not identified in the simple model
shown in Equation 1. In the words of Rossi (2014, p. 16),
we have a strong case for “first-order” endogeneity.
Recognizing the panel nature of our data, we consider
four potential approaches to model observational data to
establish the causal link between CMO presence and firm per-
formance: (1) rich data models, (2) unobserved effects mod-
els, (3) IV models, and (4) panel internal instruments models.2
2To conceptually identify the causal effect of CMO presence on
firm performance, it is useful to think of an ideal experiment (as
discussed in Angrist and Pischke 2009, 2010) in which one ran-
domly assigns the CMO position to half the firms (treatment
group) included and then tracks both types of firms (i.e., treatment
and control groups) for several years to assess the impact of CMO
presence. In such an experiment, random assignment would likely
equalize the two groups in terms of unobserved variables, and the
assignment of CMO would be random and no longer strategic
(within the bounds of randomization as noted by Leamer 1983).
Such an experiment is, of course, not practical; thus, we need to
investigate nonexperimental solutions that can be used with obser-
vational data.
We discuss these models next, and we provide a summary
of the models, including their identification assumptions, in
Table 2.
Rich Data Models
The first approach is to collect an extensive data set such
that no conceivable control variable (or proxies of such a
variable) that correlates with both CMO presence and firm
performance is omitted; we refer to these models as rich
data models. Such a data set would result in the model
shown in the following equation:
(2)                     FPit = b0 + b1CMOit + b2Xit + it,
where the matrix Xit captures the time-invariant and time-
variant control variables.3
If such an extensive set of control variables were avail-
able, ordinary least squares (OLS), which exploits both
within and between dimensions of the data, could be used
to estimate the model (Section 7.8; Wooldridge 2002).
Although we cannot claim with high confidence that no
important variable is missing in our data, we report OLS
results (i.e., using Equation 2).
Moreover, if one repeatedly observes the same firms
over time, as we do in our panel data set, it is unrealistic to
assume that the error terms for the same firm from different
time periods are uncorrelated. Therefore, a popular alterna-
tive to the model shown in Equation 2 is the random-effects
panel data model that assumes a composite error: it = ai +
uit, where ai is a firm-specific random error term that cap-
tures unobserved firm-level effects and uit is the random
component that varies across firms and over time. Random
effects ai are assumed to be i.i.d. (usually a normal distribu-
tion) and capture all correlation of the error terms over
time. Due to the random nature of firm-specific intercepts,
the random-effects model exploits within and between vari-
ance more efficiently than OLS.4
An alternative to the random-effects model is to only
exploit differences between firms, thereby ignoring the time-
series information. Such a model, referred to as the between-
estimator model (e.g., Verbeek 2012, p. 382), requires
obtaining OLS estimates with firm-level means; that is,
(3)                       FPi = b0 + b1CMOi + b2Xi + i,
where FPi denotes the average financial performance for
firm i across the years of observation (and similarly for the
4 / Journal of Marketing, May 2015
other variables), and i = ai + ui is the firm-level averaged
error term.
The identifying assumptions of the between-estimator
are similar to those of the OLS and random-effects model:
data are available on all important variables, and explana-
tory variables are uncorrelated with the composite error
term (that contains the missing variables). Although this
model can be used to estimate the CMO effect (i.e., b1), it is
generally preferable to use the random-effects estimator—
particularly when the panel time-series dimension becomes
longer—because it exploits between and within dimensions
of the data. To be consistent with N&M (see their Table 3),
we estimate the between-effects model as well.
Unobserved Effects Models
Unobserved effects models control for omitted variables by
either using firm-specific fixed effects or a lagged depen-
dent variable as a control variable. These models exploit the
fact that panel data have multiple observations for every
firm, which enables modeling firm-specific intercepts or
state dependence through a lagged dependent variable.5
Building on the model shown in Equation 2, the fixed-
effects model includes the firm-specific intercept ai; that is,
(4)                     FPit = ai + b1CMOit + b2Xit + uit,
where ai are now fixed unknown constants and uit is i.i.d.
over firms and time.
Typically, the firm-specific intercepts are not estimated;
instead, the fixed-effects approach usually estimates the
model in deviations from firm-level means. Thus, the fixed-
effects model does not require the assumption that CMOit is
uncorrelated with ai. However, it does require the assumption
that E(CMOit ¥ uis) = 0 for all s, t (and similarly for Xit) so
that the regressors are strictly exogenous. Thus, the identi-
fying assumptions underlying the fixed-effects model are
that (1) the omitted variable(s) is (are) time invariant (i.e.,
the firm-specific intercept captures the omitted variable[s])
and (2) there is enough variance in the dependent variable
as well as the focal endogenous variable within firms to
allow estimation of its effect (i.e., the focal endogenous
variable— in our case, CMO presence—is identified only
through within-firm variation). We note that after including
firm fixed effects, all time-invariant between-firm variation
is removed. Typically, when the time dimension is short
(e.g., as in Zhang and Liu 2012, in which they have seven
daily observations for all units of analysis), the identifying
assumptions of a fixed-effects model are easy to justify.
However, in our case, the sample period ranges from 5 to
12 years; thus, the identifying assumptions for the fixed-
effects model might not be easily defensible. Yet we believe
it is worth exploring this model’s results as one set of
results among others. We note that we also include time
fixed effects in the model to tease out any unique year-to-
3Here, it is necessary to assume that E(CMOit ¥ it) = 0 and
E(Xit ¥ it) = 0; (i.e., CMOit and Xit are exogenous) and some other
mild regularity conditions (e.g., Verbeek 2012, p. 373). In other
words, we would need to assume that the set of control variables
captures all unobserved variation that would otherwise be part of
the error term correlating with CMO. All remaining unobserved
variation in the error term it only correlates with the DV (i.e.,
firm performance FPit) but not systematically with CMOit or Xit.
4As is common, we use feasible generalized least squares to
estimate the random-effects model, where it is typically required
that E(CMOit ¥ uis) = 0 and E(Xit ¥ uis) = 0 for all s, t (i.e., strict
exogeneity), and E(CMOi ¥ ai) = 0 and E(Xi ¥ ai) = 0 (e.g., Ver-
beek 2012, p. 384).
5In theory, one can specify a model with both firm-specific
time-invariant effects and a lagged DV, as we do subsequently in
Equation 7. However, estimating such a model requires strong
assumptions (e.g., Nickell 1981), as we discuss in the “Panel Inter-
nal Instruments Models” section.
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year fluctuations (e.g., boom and bust cycles that uniformly
influence all firms in our sample).6
Moreover, if one believes that current firm performance
is influenced by the past (e.g., past firm decisions, carry-
over effects), the introduction of a lagged dependent
variable might control for otherwise omitted variables and
effects. Specifically, time-varying unobserved effects (as
opposed to time-invariant unobserved effects, as in the
fixed-effects model) can be captured by including the
lagged dependent variable (in our case, firm performance)
as an additional control variable in the model. We can rep-
resent such a model as follows:
(5)             FPit = b0 + b1CMOit + b2Xit + rFPit – 1 + it,
where FPit – 1 is the firm performance of the previous time
period and is included in the set of control variables.
Including a lagged dependent variable as a control
variable in the model typically reduces the autocorrelation
in the model (but does not necessarily eliminate it). Consid-
ering the model shown in Equation 5, the identifying
assumption for the CMO presence effect is that (1) the
omitted variables are fully accounted for by the lagged
dependent variable and (2) there is no serial correlation pre-
sent in the error term it. If these identifying assumptions
are met, the model would correct for firm-specific, time-
varying omitted variables. Such a model exploits both
within- and between-firm variance and can be estimated
with OLS, as we do subsequently.
IV Models
If we cannot claim on theoretical grounds that the CMO
effect is uncorrelated with the error term it in Equation 2
(e.g., due to omitted variables), an alternate approach is to
find one or more IVs that correlate with the CMO variable
but not with the unobserved determinants of firm perfor-
mance (that form part of the error term); that is, we must
find IVs that meet the instrument relevance criterion and
the exclusion restriction (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009).
The exclusion restriction can be thought of as introducing
an additional equation to Equation 2 to explain/predict
CMO presence:
(6)                       CMOit = g0 + g1Zit + g2Xit + vit,
where Zit is the IV that is excluded from Equation 2. In
addition g1 must be ≠ 0 and, similar to Xit, Zit must be
exogenous; that is, the IV must not be correlated with the
model error term in Equation 2 and E(Zit ¥ it) = 0.
The use of a “good” IV enables one to “partition the
variation [in CMO presence] into that which can be
regarded as clean or as though generated via experimental
methods, and that which is contaminated and could result in
an endogeneity bias” (Rossi 2014, p. 655). Unfortunately,
good IVs can be difficult to find. Thus, Angrist and Pischke
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(2009, p. 117) argue that finding IVs requires “a combina-
tion of institutional knowledge and ideas about processes
determining the variable of interest.” Likewise, Rossi
(2014) notes that good IVs need to be justified using institu-
tional knowledge because there is no true test for the quality
of IVs (for a discussion on statistical tests to examine the
quality of instruments, see Rossi 2014).7
We use CMO prevalence among the sample firms’ peers
as our primary IV. We define peer firms as those sample
firms that operate in the same primary two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code(s) as the focal firm and
meet other criteria (e.g., sales greater than $250 million in
2002) for inclusion in our sample.8 Specifically, for each j =
1, …, J SIC code (where J = 44 in our sample), if there are
i = 1, 2, …, Nj firms in the code, the peer influence variable
for firm i (considering that the firm only belongs to one pri-
mary SIC code j) would be the number of firms with a
CMO in code j other than firm i divided by Nj – 1. More-
over, if a firm belongs to multiple primary two-digit SIC
codes, we calculate a weighted average of CMO prevalence
using the number of sample firms in each primary SIC code
as the weight to calculate the IV. Most firms are listed in
multiple primary two-digit SIC codes, and these codes tend
to change over time within a firm; therefore, the value of
the peer CMO prevalence IV generally differs across firms
and over time.
To verify that CMO prevalence among peer firms is a
good IV, we need to, on the one hand, demonstrate instru-
ment relevance (i.e., that the IV predicts CMO presence)
and, on the other hand, argue that the IV meets the exclu-
sion restriction (i.e., establish that the IV does not correlate
with the error term that contains the omitted variables). In
terms of instrument relevance, we need to conceptually
make the case that CMO prevalence among peer firms cor-
relates with CMO presence of the focal firm. Our argument
7Two other methods are also often used that parallel the use of
IV approaches: (1) control functions and (2) matching approaches.
Similar to IV methods, the control function approach requires that
the exclusion restriction is met and uses information from the
excluded variable to introduce a term for unobserved variables in
the regression specification; thus, a control variable is introduced
for the unobserved variables. Matching on the basis of the propen-
sity score relies on creating an appropriate control group to com-
pare with the treatment group and, thus, eliminates the need for
instrumental variable(s). If treatment and control groups can be
obtained through matching, a difference-in-difference estimator
can be used to obtain the causal effect of CMO presence. For a
comparison of instrumental variables, control function, and match-
ing procedures using propensity scores, see Heckman and
Navarro-Lozano (2004).
8We used the Compustat Segments database to identify all pri-
mary two-digit SIC codes to which our sample firms belonged in
each sample year. We note that while all firms have one primary
two-digit SIC code assigned (referred to as principal two-digit SIC
code hereinafter; see Tables WA1 and WA2 in the Web Appendix),
many firms belong to more than just one primary SIC code, and
we use this information to calculate the IV. For example, in 2000,
Procter & Gamble belonged to three primary two-digit SIC codes:
20 (Food and Kindred Products), 26 (Paper and Allied Products),
and 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products).
6Time-invariant variables in Xit are not allowed in the fixed-
effects approach and are thus eliminated from the fixed-effects
model during estimation. If interest lies in such regressors, this is a
high price to pay for choosing the fixed-effects model over, for
example, the random-effects model.
here rests on two primary premises. First, we argue that the
focal firms face similar market conditions as the peer firms
because the firms operate in the same industry(ies). Second,
we assert that the expectations of the focal firm and the peer
firms are similar because we limit our sample to large firms
(more than $250 million in sales in 2002) that invest in both
advertising and R&D, functions often related to the market-
ing department. Thus, similar market conditions and simi-
larity of expectations should make the instrument relevant.
What remains to be argued is why our instrumental
variable meets the exclusion restriction—that is, why it is
uncorrelated with the omitted variables that affect the focal
firm’s financial performance. There are two types of omit-
ted variables of concern. First, there are firm-level variables
such as organizational culture (as discussed previously).
Here, we argue that the peer firms collectively either cannot
observe or measure the focal firm’s omitted variable(s) or
cannot act on those variable(s) strategically. For example,
organizational processes and cultures that are difficult to
measure and quantify are embedded in an organization’s
fabric and thus become difficult to imitate (e.g., Granovet-
ter 1985; Grewal and Slotegraaf 2007). Indeed, such pro-
cesses are often difficult for the firms themselves to imitate
(e.g., for the case of Saturn, see Kochan and Rubinstein
2000). Consequently, many firms have open secrets that are
a source of competitive advantage (Barney 1991). In addi-
tion, some sources of competitive advantage, such as patents,
have legal protection and thus are difficult to imitate as well.
Furthermore, because most of our sample firms belong to
several primary two-digit SIC codes, a large number of
firms is used to calculate a focal firm’s CMO prevalence-
based instrument.9 Thus, it seems highly unlikely that peer
firms will take collective action against a single competitor
and then also form other alliances similar in spirit to act
against other competitors (which are also part of the other
alliances these firms form). We conclude that it is unlikely
that our instrument would relate to a focal firm’s omitted
variables (e.g., organizational culture) because (1) such
variables may be difficult to assess and (2) collective action
is difficult to manage. Therefore, the instrument should be
uncorrelated with the omitted variable and, thus, the error
term that contains the omitted variable, thereby meeting the
exclusion restriction.
The second type of omitted variables of concern are
exogenous shocks that may systematically influence firm
performance and CMO prevalence over time, thereby creat-
ing a correlation between CMO prevalence and the error
term (which contains the exogenous shocks). Such shocks
could include economy-wide boom and bust cycles, in
which the health of the economy tends to dictate organiza-
tional marketing emphases (e.g., Srinivasan, Lilien, and
Sridhar 2011). Time fixed effects should be able to proxy
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shocks that are common across industries; thus, we include
these effects in our model specifications. However, such
exogenous shocks could also be specific to an industry in a
given time period; for example, as the price of crude oil
drops, the profitability of allied industries is reduced. Con-
sequently, allied industries might cut their marketing spend-
ing, and perhaps also the CMO position, as their focus
shifts from managing demand to cost cutting (e.g., Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). Therefore, we also examine a
model specification in which we include time fixed effects
interacted with industry-specific fixed effects as an additional
analysis. In such a specification, the effect of CMO preva-
lence on firm performance is identified by cross-sectional
variation in CMO prevalence and firm performance within
industries (SIC codes).
For our research, we use two IV approaches: First,
given the panel structure of our data, we use the two-stage
least-squares random-effects estimator (2SLSRE). A poten-
tially more efficient IV estimator may be obtained by
appropriately accounting for the discreteness of the CMO
variable (e.g., Wooldridge 2002). Therefore, as a second IV
model, we implement an estimation approach that accounts
for the discreteness of the CMO variable. That is, we use a
probit regression to estimate the first-stage regression
model in Equation 6 and then include the inverse Mills ratio
(IMR) as a control function in a second-stage random-
effects regression to estimate Equation 2 (see Wooldridge
2002, procedure 18.4, p. 631).10, 11
Panel Internal Instruments Models
Our fourth set of models relies on the panel nature of the
data to obtain IVs (we use the term “internal instruments”
for instruments that arise from transformations of the
included control variables in the main Equation 2 and
“external instruments” for instruments excluded from the
main Equation 2; see the “IV Models” section). Panel inter-
nal instruments models typically use some transformation
of the endogenous variable (in our case, CMO presence)
and other included exogenous variables to obtain instru-
ments. Thus, no external instruments are required to esti-
mate these models. We discuss and use the Hausman and
Taylor (1981) and the Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999)
approaches here.
9In several instances, we only have a few sample firms forming
a peer group (i.e., primary two-digit SIC code industry). As a
robustness check, we dropped peer groups with fewer than seven
firms from our sample and repeated the IV models; our main find-
ing that the estimated CMO effect is positive and significant for
Tobin’s q remained unchanged.
10We include dummy variables for the primary two-digit SIC
codes (most firms belong to multiple primary two-digit SIC codes)
to which each focal firm belongs as control variables in the first-
stage regression (i.e., Equation 6) to account for SIC-based vari-
ance in CMO presence. These industry dummy variables are
exogenous because CMO presence is not the primary variable that
determines the firms’ presence in an industry (two-digit SIC code).
We note that the CMO effect remains positive and significant
when excluding these additional SIC-based control variables from
Equation 6.
11Following Wooldridge (2002, procedure 18.4, p. 631), we
include CMO ¥ (pdf/cdf), where pdf/cdf is the IMR and (1 –
CMO) ¥ (pdf/(1 – cdf)) in the second-stage model, where CMO =
1 if the firm has a CMO and CMO = 0 otherwise. We note that this
approach requires normality assumptions for the model error
terms.
Hausman and Taylor (1981; hereinafter, HT) propose an
alternative to the (firm-specific) fixed-effects model in the
presence of endogenous variables. In particular, HT show
that the panel structure of the data can be used to obtain IVs
without requiring the traditional exclusion restrictions. The
HT approach is built on the same idea as the fixed-effects
model: it assumes that the omitted variable(s) is (are) time
invariant. Moreover, HT show that the idea can be extended
to construct mean-centered IVs that are computed from the
set of regressors. The HT approach exploits both the within
and between dimensions of the data and allows for the
inclusion of firm-specific random effects (HT; Verbeek
2012).
Building on the HT framework, Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999; hereinafter,
BB), among others, propose a more general IV framework
for panel data models based on generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimation. These models are particularly
useful when both firm-specific intercepts and lagged depen-
dent variables are included as control variables. In the BB
model, lagged measures and/or changes in lagged measures
are used as instruments for the lagged dependent variable
(in our case, firm performance) and other potentially
endogenous variables. Considering the two unobserved
heterogeneity models discussed previously (i.e., fixed-
effects and lagged dependent variable models), an alternate
specification to Equations 4 and 5 would be a model that
includes both a firm-specific error term and a lagged depen-
dent variable; that is,
(7)         FPit = b0 + b1CMOit + b2Xit + rFPit – 1 + ai + uit,
where ai and uit are both random terms defined as previ-
ously.
The estimation challenge of this model is that FPit – 1
depends on ai (i.e., the two are positively correlated) and
FPit – 1 is “endogenous” (in addition to CMOit). Moreover,
the endogeneity of FPit – 1 could bias the effect of the CMO
variable,12 and even a fixed-effects estimation, which
would remove ai, would not solve the problem because the
within-transformed lagged dependent variable is correlated
with the within-transformed error (Nickell 1981; Verbeek
2012, p. 397). Thus, an alternative estimation approach is to
take the first difference (which also removes the firm-spe-
cific error term ai), as shown in Equation 8:
(8)   FPit – FPit – 1 = b1(CMOit – CMOit – 1) + b2(Xit – Xit – 1) 
+ b3(FPit – 1 – FPit – 2) + (uit – uit – 1).
This model cannot be estimated using OLS because 
FPit – 1 is correlated with uit – 1. Instead, the endogeneity of
the differenced lagged dependent variable can be addressed
by using lagged values of the dependent variable as IVs
resulting in a GMM estimator (e.g., Arellano and Bond
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1991). However, the resulting GMM estimator has often
been found to be unreliable in empirical applications
because the lagged instruments tend to be weakly correlated
with subsequent first differences, especially when the
endogenous variables (in our case, lagged firm performance
and CMO presence) are highly persistent (i.e., when there is
serial correlation in these variables; BB). Thus, we must
rely on GMM estimators that break the persistence in the
data. Considering the various existing GMM estimators,
BB’s seems to be the most popular (for a critique, see
Roodman 2009). In brief, the BB estimator considers Equa-
tions 7 and 8 as a system of equations. That is, it uses the
lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments
for the equation in levels (i.e., Equation 7) as well as lagged
levels of the dependent variable as instruments for the equa-
tion in first differences (i.e., Equation 8; see also Arellano
and Bover 1995) to control for the potential endogeneity of
the lagged dependent variable. The resulting system is usu-
ally estimated with a GMM approach. The validity of the
(lagged) difference instruments for the levels equations
depends on the assumption that changes in the dependent
variable are uncorrelated with ai, which is the case when
the series is in a more or less steady state (e.g., Blundell and
Bond 1999, pp. 7–8; Verbeek 2012, p. 403).
Overall Proposed Modeling Approach
The model specifications discussed previously rely on vary-
ing identifying assumptions and data requirements, as sum-
marized in Table 2. Recognizing that there are many poten-
tial models available, we suggest that researchers explore
the meaning of the various models’ identifying assumptions
in light of their context and then determine the appropriate
specifications (as opposed to mechanically estimating many
potential models and then only reporting the model[s] that
provide[s] the best results, thus becoming, in the words of
Angrist and Pischke [2009, p. 28], “regression mechanics”).
For example, if researchers believe that they have an endo-
geneity problem of the first order and they can provide
strong theoretical arguments for a good IV, the IV approach
should be preferred. Similarly, some assumptions may be
too strong for the specific situation a researcher faces (e.g.,
in our case, considering that we have a 12-year panel of
annual firm data, it might be difficult to defend the fixed-
effects assumption—i.e., that the cause for endogeneity of
the CMO effect is time invariant), and thus such models
may be ruled out from a conceptual standpoint.
We also want to recognize that it is important to assess
and discuss the robustness of the results to various identify-
ing assumptions (e.g., using both internal and external
instruments) and investigate the same phenomenon from
different vantage points. Indeed, it is conceivable that dif-
ferent models do not produce the same results. If that is the
case, a careful conceptual justification is required for the
identifying assumptions of the effect based on institutional
knowledge. Thus, researchers should view themselves as
regression engineers as opposed to “regression mechanics”
(Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 28) and understand the mean-
ing of the model identifying assumptions for their context.
Upon developing such an understanding, regression engi-
12While the direction and magnitude of the potential bias in the
CMO effect are difficult to predict beforehand, some evidence
exists in the literature that suggests that the estimated CMO effect
may be biased downward (i.e., we would underestimate the CMO
effect; see Keele and Kelly 2006).
neers should estimate and discuss a subset of models whose
identifying assumptions make the most sense given the data
and problem context (e.g., the models we summarize in
Table 2). If the findings are convergent and show robust-
ness, they would strengthen belief in the conclusions
drawn. However, if the findings are not convergent, careful
analysis of the identifying assumptions is needed to assess
which results, if any, to believe or whether a different
approach (e.g., a longer time series or additional control
variables) is necessary.
Samples and Measures
In a first step, we aimed to replicate N&M’s sample as
closely as possible. Thus, using the Compustat database and
considering the five-year period 2000–2004, we identified
firms with sales of at least $250 million in 2002. From this
set, and in line with N&M, we retained only firms without
missing data on the various factors (e.g., advertising,
R&D). Moreover, in N&M’s footnote 7, they provide a
breakdown of their sample by principal two-digit SIC code.
We only retained firms with principal two-digit SIC codes
represented in N&M’s sample. Using N&M’s (p. 70) filters,
and after repeated efforts, our first sample (referred to as
Sample 1 subsequently) consisted of 123 firms for which we
were able to collect complete data across the five sample
years. In comparison, N&M’s sample comprises 167 firms.
We note that N&M excluded several firms/SIC codes
for which complete data were available for 2000–2004. For
example, N&M excluded firms from the Food and Kindred
Products industry (e.g., General Mills Inc., Hershey Co., Kel-
logg Co.), the Transportation Equipment industry (e.g., Ford
Motor Co., General Motors Co., Oshkosh Corp.), and Miscel-
laneous Manufacturing Industries (e.g., Mattel Inc., Hasbro
Inc., Callaway Golf Co.). Therefore, we created Sample 2,
which included these additional firms and principal two-digit
SIC codes. The total number of firms included in Sample 2 is
155. Tables WA1 and WA2 in the Web Appendix compare
our samples with N&M’s in terms of principal SIC codes.
Moreover, since N&M’s study was conducted, addi-
tional firm years have become available beyond 2004. At
the time our research was initiated, the most recent year
with full secondary data available was 2011. We thus cre-
ated Samples 3 and 4 by adding as many firm years as pos-
sible to Samples 1 and 2. We note that the overall number of
firms is the same in Samples 1 and 3 (i.e., 123 firms) as
well as Samples 2 and 4 (i.e., 155 firms).13
CMO Presence
Considering Sample 4, our most complete sample, the per-
centage of firms with a CMO did not change significantly
between 2000 and 2011: specifically, 35% of the sample
firms had a CMO in 2000, whereas 37% had one in 2011
(the percentage of firms with a CMO ranged from 32% to
40% throughout our 12 sample years). These percentages
are comparable to those reported by N&M: their CMO per-
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centages ranged between 39% and 44%. We note, however,
that although overall CMO prevalence across all firms
remained fairly stable during the 12 sample years, it varied
significantly within our respective sample firms. For exam-
ple, in Sample 4, the largest sample, 30% of the firms had
no CMO during the entire 12 years, 7% of the firms had a
CMO during the entire 12 years, and 63% of the firms had
a CMO during some years but not during others. In addi-
tion, considering Sample 1, our smallest and the sample
closest to N&M’s sample, 41% of the firms had no CMO
during the entire five years, 16% of the firms had a CMO
during the entire five years, and 42% of the firms had a
CMO during some years and not during others. These num-
bers compare reasonably well with N&M’s, in which
approximately 66% of the firms showed no variance in
CMO presence. We also conducted a simulation study,
described in detail in the Appendix, which suggests that our
data exhibit sufficient within-firm CMO variation over time
to estimate our models.
Measures
We closely followed N&M’s data collection procedures,
collecting all variables, including the control variables. To
do so, we used various secondary data sources, including
COMPUSTAT, company websites, firms’ 10-Ks, and proxy
statements retrieved via EDGAR, Bloomberg, and Capital
IQ. We included the following control variables in all our
models: innovation, differentiation, corporate branding,
total diversification, CEO tenure, outsider CEO, market
concentration, number of employees (log), chief operating
officer (COO) presence, and return on assets. We also
included sales growth as an additional control variable in all
models except those in which sales growth is the perfor-
mance measure. For detailed information on the data collec-
tion procedures and variables, see N&M (pp. 71–72).14
Performance Measures
The CMO is posited to have both short- and long-term perfor-
mance implications (e.g., Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha 2010).
Thus, to assess whether and how CMO presence affects
firm performance, we require a performance measure that is
forward looking and cumulative. Moreover, given the cross
section of firms (i.e., organizational heterogeneity) included in
our sample, the measure also must be generalizable and com-
parable across (1) firms in many different industries and (2)
firms that pursue different performance outcome goals.
Historically, most of the academic (marketing) research
investigating firm performance has employed accounting-
13We list the names of the firms included in the four samples in
Tables WA3 and WA4 in the Web Appendix.
14We excluded the two variables TMT marketing experience
and TMT general management experience from our models for
two reasons. First, as in N&M’s case, biographical data were
available for only approximately 75% of the executives of the
sample firms. Second, virtually all TMT members had general
management experience, so the variable showed no variation (i.e.,
it was 1 for almost all firms). We note, however, that when we
estimated our models including the TMT marketing experience
variable (based on data for approximately 75% of the executives),
the CMO effect remained positive and significant in all but the
between-effects model (using Sample 4).
based measures such as sales growth or return on invest-
ments (e.g., Buzzell and Gale 1987; Jacobson 1990). How-
ever, in the words of Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl
(2004, p. 174), “such measures … contain little or no infor-
mation about the future value of a firm.” Indeed, accounting-
based measures assume that previous investments affect
only current-period earnings. Yet, in reality, most types of
firm investments (e.g., employing a CMO) affect future
earnings as well (e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe
2002). Similarly, firms in the same industry may differ in
their short-term objectives (e.g., one may emphasize prof-
itability and the other may stress growth), and thus, the
goals of the CMOs should differ across firms. Moreover,
because of industry and firm differences in accounting prac-
tices, a comparison of accounting-based measures (e.g., sales
growth, return on investment) across industries and firms is
problematic (Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl 2004).
Capital market–based measures overcome these chal-
lenges in several ways: (1) they capture both immediate and
future firm performance; (2) they are organizational goal
agnostic, permitting performance comparison across firms
that pursue different performance goals (e.g., growth vs.
profits); and (3) they are less affected by accounting con-
ventions because they include the potential effect of
accounting practice inconsistencies across industries when
evaluating expected future revenue streams (e.g., Amit and
Wernerfelt 1990). Thus, capital market–based measures
(rather than accounting-based measures) seem appropriate
for the purpose of the study.
Consistent with N&M, we employ Tobin’s q as our
focal performance outcome measure. Tobin’s q, the ratio of
a firm’s market value to the current replacement cost of its
assets (Tobin 1969), is a forward-looking, capital market–
based measure of the value of a firm. It provides a measure
of the premium (or discount) that the market is willing to
pay above (below) the replacement costs of a firm’s assets,
thus capturing any above-normal returns expected from a
firm’s collection of assets (Amit and Wernerfelt 1990).
Another appealing feature of Tobin’s q is that it adjusts for
expected market risk; in other words, because Tobin’s q
combines capital market data with accounting data, it
implicitly uses the correct risk-adjusted discount rate and
thus minimizes distortion (e.g., Amit and Wernerfelt 1990;
Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988).
In addition to Tobin’s q, we also consider the CMO’s
impact on three other capital market–based performance
measures: Jensen’s a, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic
risk. Jensen’s a (e.g., Aksoy et al. 2008; Jensen 1968; Lyon,
Barber, and Tsai 1999) is the intercept derived from a risk
model, usually the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model
augmented with the momentum factor (Carhart 1997).
Jensen’s a should be zero unless the firm has a value driver
not captured by the independent variables of the risk model
(e.g., Jacobson and Mizik 2009); in other words, it captures
risk-adjusted returns in excess of or below those predicted
by the risk model.
Conceptual and empirical evidence suggests that 
marketing-related investments serve to reduce firm risk
(e.g., McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim 2007; Srivastava,
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Shervani, and Fahey 1998; Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009).
Therefore, it may be that CMO presence has risk-reducing
properties. Because both Tobin’s q and Jensen’s a are risk-
adjusted measures (e.g., Aksoy et al. 2008; Madden, Fehle,
and Fournier 2006; Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988) and,
in that sense, mask the effect of CMO presence on firm risk,
we also investigate the CMO’s direct impact on a firm’s
systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Systematic risk represents
the degree to which a firm’s stock returns are a function of
market returns and thus are undiversifiable. In contrast,
idiosyncratic risk represents risk specific to a firm that can
be eliminated from an investment portfolio (e.g., Lintner
1965). Although there is an ongoing debate about the use-
fulness of risk measures for predicting firm value (e.g.,
Fama and French 1992; McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim
2007), both idiosyncratic and systematic risk are important
aspects of shareholder value (for a detailed discussion, see
Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009), and we therefore include them
as two additional performance measures.
Finally, we report the impact of CMO presence on sales
growth to be consistent with N&M, who used both Tobin’s
q and sales growth as their performance measures. Follow-
ing N&M, we calculate sales growth as the increase in sales
as a proportion of the sales in the preceding year. However,
because it is an accounting- and not a capital market–based
measure, we maintain that sales growth is not a suitable
measure for the context of this study. Table 3 presents the
descriptive statistics.
Results
The CMO and Firm Tobin’s q
Model-free evidence. We first present model-free evi-
dence regarding the relationship between CMO presence
and Tobin’s q. Considering Sample 4, our largest sample,
and the average Tobin’s q across all time periods (i.e.,
2000–2011), firms with a CMO in a given year, on average,
displayed a Tobin’s q of .75, whereas firms without a CMO
displayed a Tobin’s q of .36. This difference is statistically
significant (t = 5.37), suggesting that firms do benefit from
having a CMO among the TMT (we note that we could
have also estimated this effect using the model shown in
Equation 1). We also plotted the average Tobin’s q values by
year and CMO presence to capture the CMO effect in each
time period. Figure 1 and Table 4 show the average Tobin’s
q values of firms with and without a CMO across the 12
years. Although the difference in Tobin’s q is not statisti-
cally significant in each time period (except in 2000, 2001,
2003, 2009, and 2010), Figure 1 again suggests that firms
indeed benefit from having a CMO at the strategy table: the
line depicting Tobin’s q of CMO firms is always above the
line depicting Tobin’s q of non-CMO firms. Notably, the
average Tobin’s q of both types of firms (i.e., CMO and
non-CMO firms) was significantly greater in 2000 than in
subsequent years, likely the result of the Internet bubble.
Model-based evidence. We begin our model-based analy-
sis by estimating a between-effects model using Sample 1
(Study 1a in Table 5) to replicate N&M’s work as closely as
possible. Like N&M, we find that the between-effects model
indicates a nonsignificant CMO effect. Using the same sam-
ple (i.e., Sample 1), we then estimated the remaining models
(Study 1b in Table 5). The CMO effect remains statistically
nonsignificant in the OLS, random-effects, fixed-effects,
OLS with lagged dependent variable and HT models. How-
ever, we obtain a significant and positive CMO effect in the
2SLSRE, random-effects with control function, and BB
models.15
We then repeated our analyses using Sample 2 (Study 2
in Table 5). The CMO effect remains statistically nonsignifi-
cant when using the between-effects model; however, it
becomes significant in all other model specifications. Sub-
sequently, we estimated our models using Sample 3 (Study
3 in Table 5), and we obtain similar results to those obtained
using Sample 2; that is, the CMO effect is positive and sig-
nificant in all models except the between-effects model.
Finally, using Sample 4, our largest sample, we repeated our
analyses and again obtain a positive and significant CMO
effect in all models but the between-effects model (Study 4
in Table 5). Thus, the CMO effect is fairly robust in terms
of sign and statistical significance across various model
identifying assumptions. Moreover, as the sample size
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increases from Sample 1 to Sample 4, the respective stan-
dard errors of the estimated CMO effect tend to decrease,
lending higher confidence in the estimated CMO effect. We
report the full model results for Sample 4, including control
variables, in Table 6. For the full model results for Samples
1–3, see Tables WA5–WA7 in the Web Appendix.16
The effect of outliers. Using various outlier diagnostics
(e.g., residual vs. fitted plots), we identified four firms with
large lagged Tobin’s q values that are potential outliers.
Specifically, considering 2000, Yahoo Inc., RF Micro Devices
Inc., Tibco Software Inc., and Foundry Networks Inc. each
had lagged Tobin’s q values of greater than 15 (i.e., large
Tobin’s q values in 1999, likely a result of the Internet bub-
ble). Moreover, the company Move Inc. seems to have had an
unusually large sales growth value, also in 2000, which is
likely the result of a lawsuit that year (e.g., see Move Inc.’s
2000 10-K report). The unusually large lagged Tobin’s q
15The instrument for CMO presence (i.e., CMO prevalence
among peer firms) emerged as a significant predictor of CMO
presence in the first-stage regression across all samples. For exam-
ple, considering Sample 1, CMO prevalence’s coefficient (z =
5.90) and the F-test of excluded instruments/Cragg–Donald Wald
F-statistic (F = 4.77, p < .0001) are both strongly significant.
16We note that we also estimated our IV models using various
other instrument and sample configurations. Our conclusions did
not change: the CMO effect remained positive and significant. For
example, using Sample 4, (1) we only considered the sample firms’
principal SIC code (see Tables WA1 and WA2 in the Web Appendix)
to identify the firms’ respective sample peer group/calculate the
CMO prevalence IV and (2) to ensure that CMO prevalence is cal-
culated using a representative sample of peer firms, we only
included sample firms that belong to principal SIC groups with 20
or more firms in them. Considering Model 6 (2SLSRE), the CMO
effect was .76 (z = 3.14), and the F-test of excluded instruments/
Cragg–Donald Wald F-statistic was 15.44 (p < .0001).
FIGURE 1
Average Tobin’s q of Firms With and Without a CMO
   




















CMO   No CMO      
Notes: Following N&M, the depicted Tobin’s q averages are derived from the respective firms’ raw Tobin’s q values less the median industry
values of each firm’s principal two-digit SIC level.
TABLE 4
Average Tobin’s q of Firms With and Without a CMO
Year                        2000      2001      2002      2003      2004      2005      2006      2007      2008      2009      2010       2011
Tobin’s q (CMO)       1.71       1.28        .71           .86         .66        .45           .44         .39         .45         .59         .48        .41
Tobin’s q (no CMO)    .9            .52        .55           .33         .28        .32           .16         .18         .25         .09         .13        .35
t-value                      1.96       2.94        .87         2.14       1.61        .56         1.46       1.03       1.43       3.13       1.92        .30
observations from 1999 for the four aforementioned firms
may have an impact on the CMO (point) estimate of Mod-
els 5 (i.e., OLS with lagged dependent variable) and 9 (i.e.,
BB) because we included the lagged Tobin’s q variable in
these two models. Moreover, the large sales growth value
for the firm Move Inc. may affect all model results.
We examined robustness to these potential outliers in two
ways. First, we dropped the five firms with potential outliers
from our sample (all years) and then reestimated Models 5
and 9 using Sample 4. The estimated CMO effect remained
positive and significant in both models (OLS with lagged
dependent variable: bCMO = .13, t = 2.79; BB: bCMO = .38,
z = 2.08), demonstrating that our estimation results in Table
5 for Models 5 and 9 are robust to these potential outliers.
Second, again using Sample 4, we reestimated the remain-
ing models after removing Move Inc. (all years) from our
initial sample. Again, the CMO effect remained positive
14 / Journal of Marketing, May 2015
and significant in all but the between-effects model (OLS:
bCMO = .27, t = 4.44; between-effects: bCMO = .25, t = 1.35;
random-effects: bCMO = .26, z = 4.02; fixed-effects: bCMO =
.19, t = 2.88; 2SLSRE: bCMO = .78, z = 4.30; random-effects
with control function: bCMO = .58, z = 2.79; HT: bCMO =
.23, z = 3.49).
The CMO and Other Measures of Market-Based
Performance
Jensen’s a. To assess the CMO’s impact on Jensen’s a, we
used the calendar–time portfolio approach and constructed
a portfolio that buys (sells) stocks of our sample firms (i.e.,
Sample 4) with (without) a CMO (e.g., Aksoy et al. 2008;
Jacobson and Mizik 2009; Madden, Fehle, and Fournier
2006). Considering the 12 years of observed data, we rebal-
anced this portfolio every month such that firms that had a
CMO in month t but not in month t + 1 exited the portfolio
TABLE 5
Results—DV: Tobin’s q
                                                                                                                                           CMO Effect (SE)
                                                                                                            Studies 1a                                Study 3:          Study 4:
                                                                                                               and 1b:           Study 2:        123 Firms,      155 Firms,
                                                                                                            123 Firms,      155 Firms,           up to               up to
                            Model                                                                        5 Years,          5 Years,         12 Years,        12 Years,
Model Type       Number                           Modelsa                              n = 615            n = 775           n = 1258          n = 1604
Rich                         1            OLSb                                                            .15                   .27**                .21***               .26***
data                                                                                                       (.13)                 (.11)                 (.07)                 (.06)
models                 2            Between-effectsc                                         .02                   .26                   .15                   .24
                                                                                                              (.25)                 (.22)                 (.21)                 (.19)
                            3            Random-effects                                          .21                   .30***               .22***               .24***
                                                                                                              (.13)                 (.11)                 (.08)                 (.06)
Unobserved             4            Fixed-effects                                                .17                   .23*                  .18**                .18***
heterogeneity                                                                                         (.15)                 (.13)                 (.08)                 (.07)
models                 5            OLS with lagged DV                                    .08                   .18*                  .14**                .17***
                                                                                                           (.12)                 (.10)                 (.07)                 (.06)
IV models                 6            2SLSRE                                                       .79**                .81***               .75***               .77***
                                                                                                              (.32)                 (.28)                 (.21)                 (.18)
                            7            Random-effects with control functiond          .83**              1.02***               .57**                .55***
                                                                                                           (.38)                 (.35)                 (.25)                 (.21)
Panel                       8            HT                                                                .21                   .27**                .21***               .21***
instruments                                                                                            (.14)                 (.12)                 (.08)                 (.07)
models                 9            BBe                                                              .96***               .60*                  .48***               .46**




aFollowing N&M, we included the following control variables in the models: innovation, differentiation, corporate branding, total diversification,
CEO tenure, outsider CEO, market concentration, number of employees (log), COO presence, return on assets, and sales growth. We also
included year fixed effects in all models except the between-effects model.
bWe also estimated this model including industry-specific year fixed effects to ensure that industry-specific exogenous shocks do not system-
atically influence firm performance and CMO prevalence over time. The CMO effect remained positive and significant (bCMO = .22, t = 3.03;
based on n = 1,604). Moreover, we also estimated the model (n = 1,604) using robust standard errors; the standard error changed from .062
to .065, and the CMO effect continued to be significant (t = 3.95 instead of t = 4.16).
cModel used by N&M. We note that N&M also included the lagged DV as a control variable in their model. We excluded the lagged DV here
but note that the CMO effect remains nonsignificant when including the lagged DV in the model.
dWe used the control function approach (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, procedure 18.4, p. 631): using a probit regression (DV = CMO presence; CMO
prevalence in industry included as IV), we first calculated the IMR and then added the IMR ¥ CMO variables as well as the (1 – CMO)[(pdf/(1 –
cdf)] variable to Model 3 (i.e., the random-effects model).
eWe included the second and third lag of the CMO and Tobin’s q (t – 1) variables as instruments and note that the results are robust to other
lag structures. In addition, the AR(2) test for autocorrelation of the residuals suggests that the differenced residuals do not exhibit significant
AR(2) behavior.
Notes: DV = dependent variable.
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at the beginning of month t + 1 and firms that did not have a
CMO in month t but then hired a CMO in month t + 1 entered
the portfolio at the beginning of month t + 1. We rebalanced
monthly (as opposed to, e.g., yearly) because of differences
in fiscal year ends of our sample firms (e.g., some firms’
fiscal year ended in December, others in March). As before,
we used the firms’ 10-Ks and proxy statements to identify
CMO presence. Using value-weighted and continuous
monthly returns (e.g., Jacobson and Mizik 2009), we esti-
mated the following Fama–French (1993) three-factor model
augmented with the momentum factor (Carhart 1997) using
stock-market data obtained from the Center for Research in
Security Prices and Kenneth French’s data library:
(9)    (Rpt – Rft) = µp + bp(Rmt – Rft) + gp(SMB)t + dp(HML)t
+ qp(MOM)t + pt,
where Rpt is the rate of return of our portfolio of CMO
firms in month t, Rft is the monthly risk-free return in
month t, Rmt is the monthly return on a value-weighted
market portfolio in month t, SMBt is the Fama–French size
portfolio in month t, HMLt is the Fama–French market-to-
16 / Journal of Marketing, May 2015
book ratio portfolio in month t, and MOMt is the momen-
tum factor in month t.
The intercept µp (i.e., Jensen’s a) of the model provides
an estimate of excess returns. Under the null hypothesis of
no excess returns, µp will not be significantly different
from zero (e.g., Jacobson and Mizik 2009; Jensen 1968).
Consistent with our previous findings, the intercept of the
model is positive and significant (a = .004, t = 2.61), pro-
viding strong corroborating evidence that firms benefit
from having a CMO at the strategy table.
Systematic and idiosyncratic risk. We obtained the sys-
tematic and idiosyncratic risk measures by estimating the
Fama–French model (see Equation 9) separately for each
firm–year combination using daily stock-market data,
which we again obtained from the Center for Research in
Security Prices and Kenneth French’s data library (e.g., Tuli
and Bharadwaj 2009). We then used the two risk measures
as the respective dependent variables in our nine models
and report the results in Table 7. As with the previous analy-
ses, we used Sample 4 for this analysis.
As the results indicate, CMO presence does not seem to
have an impact on systematic risk of the firm across all
TABLE 7
Results—Other DVs; Based on Sample 4
                                                                                                                                           CMO Effect (SE)
                                                                                                                                          DV:                  DV:                  DV:
                            Model                                                                            DV:            Systematic   Idiosyncratic        Sales
Model Type       Number                           Modelsa                            Tobin’s q            Risk                Risk              Growth
Rich                         1            OLS                                                             .26**                .01                   .001               –.00
data                                                                                                       (.06)                 (.02)                 (.001)               (.01)
models                 2            Between-effectsb                                         .24                   .00                   .0002             –.01
                                                                                                              (.19)                 (.06)                 (.0002)             (.02)
                            3            Random-effects                                           .24**                .02                   .001                 .00
                                                                                                              (.06)                 (.02)                 (.001)               (.01)
Unobserved             4            Fixed-effects                                                .18**                .02                   .0004               .02
heterogeneity                                                                                         (.07)                 (.02)                 (.001)               (.01)
models                 5            OLS with lagged DV                                    .17**                .01                   .0003             –.01
                                                                                                           (.06)                 (.02)                 (.0004)             (.01)
IV models                 6            2SLSRE                                                       .77**                .01                   .003*              –.01
                                                                                                              (.18)                 (.06)                 (.0016)             (.03)
                            7            Random-effects with control functionc           .55**              –.03                   .002                 .002
                                                                                                           (.21)                 (.07)                 (.04)                 (.04)
Panel                       8            HT                                                                .21**                .02                   .001                 .00
instruments                                                                                            (.07)                 (.04)                 (.001)               (.01)
models                 9            BBd                                                              .46*                  .06                   .0003             –.03
                                                                                                           (.18)                 (.06)                 (.001)               (.03)
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
aFollowing N&M, we included the following control variables in the models: innovation, differentiation, corporate branding, total diversification,
CEO tenure, outsider CEO, market concentration, number of employees (log), COO presence, return on assets, and sales growth (except for
the model in which DV is sales growth), and Tobin’s q (except for the model in which DV is Tobin’s q). We also included year fixed effects in
all models except the between-effects model.
bModel used by N&M. We note that N&M also included the lagged DV as a control variable in their model. We excluded the lagged DV here
but note that the CMO effect remains nonsignificant when including the lagged DV in the model.
cWe used the control function approach (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, procedure 18.4, p. 631): using a probit regression (DV = CMO presence; CMO
prevalence in industry included as IV), we first calculated the IMR and then added the IMR ¥ CMO variables as well as the (1 – CMO)[(pdf/(1 –
cdf)] variable to Model 3 (i.e., the random-effects model).
dWe included the second and third lag of the CMO and financial performance (t – 1) variables as instruments and note that the results are
robust to other lag structures. In addition, the AR(2) test for autocorrelation of the residuals suggests that the differenced residuals do not
exhibit significant AR(2) behavior.
Notes: DV = dependent variable.
models. In contrast, the result from the 2SLSRE model
(Model 6) suggests that CMO presence has a positive
impact on idiosyncratic risk of the firm. Notably, however,
none of the other models reveals a significant positive or
negative CMO effect on idiosyncratic risk. Thus, we are
faced with a situation in which we do not obtain convergent
findings across models that are based on various identifying
assumptions, as discussed previously. Instead of disregard-
ing the nonsignificant (or significant) results, we must now
carefully assess the identifying assumptions of the various
models used and decide which result(s), if any, to believe.
Previously, we argued that the CMO presence variable is
likely endogenous, and we believe that we have made a
strong case for our IV. Moreover, the Hausman test suggests
that the 2SLSRE model is preferred over the rich data mod-
els, supporting the notion that CMO presence is endoge-
nous. Thus, an IV model is likely to have the most reason-
able identifying assumptions, and we therefore consider the
finding obtained from the 2SLSRE model noteworthy.
However, because the CMO effect is (positive but) not sig-
nificant in the random-effects with control function model,
our other IV model, we cannot conclude with high certainty
that CMO presence indeed has a positive effect on idiosyn-
cratic risk, a point we further address in the “Discussion”
section.
The CMO and Firm Sales Growth
To be consistent with N&M, we also assessed the CMO’s
impact on sales growth. We again use Sample 4 as well as
all nine models and report the results in Table 7. We find
that CMO presence does not appear to have a (main) effect
on a firm’s sales growth, consistent with N&M’s findings.
We also estimated the model after removing the observa-
tions for Move Inc., because of the company’s unusually
large sales growth in 2000 (see previous discussion); the
results did not change in any meaningful way. We also note
that CMO presence does not appear to have a lagged effect
(one or two years) on sales growth. As outlined previously,
we maintain that sales growth is not a suitable measure to
capture the performance implications of the CMO. Thus,
we speculate that these nonfindings are at least partially a
function of the sales growth measure (1) not being able to
capture future performance implications of the CMO and
(2) being an organizational goal agnostic measure.
Do Certain Firms Benefit More (or Less) from a
CMO?
We next examined whether the effect of CMO presence is
moderated by firm-specific characteristics—that is, whether
some firms benefit more or less from having a CMO. We
again used Sample 4 for this analysis. We first focus on
Tobin’s q as the outcome measure and subsequently exam-
ine the other outcome measures, that is, systematic and
idiosyncratic risk, as well as sales growth. We present
results from the 2SLSRE model here but note that the
results were consistent across all models (results are avail-
able from the authors). In brief, Tobin’s q seems to be
improved by CMO presence in the TMT for (1) firms with
relatively higher sales growth, (2) firms that are relatively
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smaller, and (3) firms whose CEO has relatively shorter
tenure. We present the results in Table 8.
CMO ¥ sales growth. The positive and significant inter-
action between CMO presence and sales growth seems con-
sistent with extant strategy and marketing literature. For
example, Day and Wensley (1988) propose that firms real-
ize greater benefit from generating and acting on customer-
oriented information in high-growth scenarios (also see
Slater and Narver 1994). Considering that the CMO has
long been viewed as the most direct steward of a firm’s cus-
tomers (e.g., Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha 2010) as well as the
voice of the customer in the C-suite (e.g., McGovern et al.
2004), it can be expected that the CMO’s performance
impact is elevated in higher sales-growth firms.
CMO ¥ number of employees. We find that the positive
effect of CMO presence declines as the number of employ-
ees increases. Literature suggests that as the number of
employees increases, the size of the TMT also increases
(e.g., Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993). Moreover, the larger
the TMT, the less power each individual TMT member
tends to have (e.g., Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Canella
2009). Thus, as the number of employees increases, the
CMO’s influence on organizational strategic direction
might decrease, providing support for the observed negative
interaction effect.
CMO ¥ CEO tenure. We find that the positive effect of
CMO presence also decreases as the tenure of the CEO
increases. This finding is consistent with extant literature
that suggests that CEO power and influence increases with
CEO tenure and, conversely, that other TMT members’
power and influence is negatively related to CEO tenure
(e.g., Hill and Phan 1991). Thus, the longer the CEO is in
place, the less impact the CMO should have on the direc-
tion and strategy of the firm, in support of decreased perfor-
mance implications of the CMO.
Other performance outcome measures. We next
assessed moderating effects considering the other perfor-
mance outcome measures, systematic and idiosyncratic
risk, as well as sales growth. As Table 8 shows, a negative
and marginally significant interaction between CMO pres-
ence and differentiation emerged when systematic risk was
the dependent variable. Moreover, a positive and significant
interaction between CMO presence and differentiation
emerged in the model in which sales growth was the depen-
dent variable. Although the interaction was not significant
when considering Tobin’s q as the outcome measure (see
Table 8), the finding is consistent with N&M’s prediction
that firms pursuing relatively high levels of differentiation
should benefit more from having a CMO in the C-suite than
firms pursuing lower levels of differentiation (N&M did not
find empirical support for this hypothesis). Quite correctly
in our opinion, N&M argue that strategies of differentiation
increase the need to identify market opportunities quickly.
Moreover, they maintain that strategies of differentiation
rely heavily on marketing capabilities and that having a
CMO among the TMT should help develop and foster such
capabilities.
Considering idiosyncratic risk as the performance out-
come measure, we also find a positive and significant inter-
action between CMO presence and sales growth. Recall that
we also find a positive interaction between CMO presence
and sales growth when considering Tobin’s q as the perfor-
mance outcome measure. Thus, both Tobin’s q and idiosyn-
cratic risk seem to be increased by CMO presence in firms
with relatively higher sales growth. We posit that the joint
effect of CMO presence and sales growth on idiosyncratic
risk can at least be partially explained by the notion that
CMOs tend to be risk seeking (e.g., Lord 2014). Indeed,
when a firm experiences high growth, its CMOs might be
even more risk prone, in support of the observed positive
interaction effect.
Double selection. We also took into consideration a
potential double selection effect as we examined the inter-
actions. That is, the selection of a CMO and the selection of
a firm strategy (differentiation, innovation, diversification,
and branding strategy) may be occurring at the same time,
thus resulting in double selection effects. To address this
potential issue, we reestimated the 2SLSRE models shown
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in Table 8 treating not only the CMO variable but also the
four firm strategy variables as endogenous. We used peer
firm variables (e.g., differentiation prevalence among peer
firms) as instruments for the firm strategy variables follow-
ing the same procedure and logic as for the CMO presence
instrument. The results again suggest that Tobin’s q seems
to be improved by CMO presence in the TMT for (1) firms
with relatively higher sales growth, (2) firms that are rela-
tively smaller, and (3) firms whose CEO has relatively
shorter tenure. Moreover, as before, systematic risk seems
to be decreased (and sales growth increased) by CMO pres-
ence in the TMT for firms that are relatively more differen-
tiated. Finally, as before, we find a positive and significant
interaction effect between sales growth and CMO presence
when idiosyncratic risk is the dependent variable.
Discussion
The CMO Is Not Dead!
Recent business press articles have suggested that CMOs
are increasingly “powerless and peripheral” (e.g., Turpin
TABLE 8
Results—Interaction Effects; Based on Sample 4 and Model 6 (2SLSRE)
                                                                                                              CMO Effect (SE)
Variablea                                                      DV: Tobin’s q          DV: Systematic Risk   DV: Idiosyncratic Risk     DV: Sales Growth
CMO                                                        .77***                             .04                                 .003**                           –.02
                                                           (.16)                               (.05)                               (.001)                             (.02)
CMO ¥ Sales growth                               .73***                           –.11                                  .005**                         Omitted
                                                           (.24)                               (.08)                               (.002)
CMO ¥ Differentiation                            1.24                             –1.12*                              –.02                                 .89**
                                                         (2.04)                               (.67)                               (.02)                               (.38)
CMO ¥ Innovation                                –1.18                               –.10                               –.006                               .15
                                                           (.80)                               (.27)                               (.007)                             (.15)
CMO ¥ Return on assets                       –.04                                 .18                                 .001                               .13
                                                           (.40)                               (.13)                               (.004)                             (.08)
CMO ¥ Number of employees                –.16***                           –.01                               –.0005                           –.001
                                                           (.05)                               (.02)                               (.0004)                           (.01)
CMO ¥ Market concentration                 –.0002                           –.0001                           –.0000                           –.00
                                                           (.0001)                           (.0001)                           (.0000)                           (.00)
CMO ¥ Diversification                              .10                                 .02                               –.0001                           –.01
                                                           (.14)                               (.05)                               (.001)                             (.03)
CMO ¥ Corporate branding                   –.07                               –.01                               –.0004                           –.03
                                                           (.14)                               (.05)                               (.001)                             (.03)
CMO ¥ Outsider CEO                            –.12                               –.02                                 .002*                            –.05*
                                                           (.14)                               (.05)                               (.001)                             (.03)
CMO ¥ CEO tenure                               –.003***                         –.0004                           –.0000                           –.0002
                                                           (.001)                             (.0003)                           (.0000)                           (.00014)
CMO ¥ COO                                          –.06                               –.06                                 .001                             –.04
                                                          (.13)                               (.04)                               (.001)                             (.03)
*p < .10
**p < .05.
***p < .01. 
aWe excluded the CMO ¥ Sales growth interaction from Model 4 (DV: Sales Growth) because sales growth is the DV of that model. We also
note that we included the interactions between CMO and the respective year dummies in all the models. In addition, the variance inflation 
factors of the coefficients are less than 5 across all models, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern.
Notes: DV = dependent variable.
2012, titled “The CMO Is Dead”). Our findings, which
seem to be quite robust, question such conclusions. In short,
our findings suggest that firms benefit from having a CMO
among the TMT. Considering our largest sample (Sample
4), the CMO’s effect on Tobin’s q ranges from .17 to
approximately .77, depending on model specification. Thus,
on the basis of the smallest CMO effect estimate (i.e., .17),
our data and analyses suggest that Tobin’s q of firms that
employ a CMO is approximately 15% larger than that of
firms that do not employ a CMO.17 The CMO effect also
seems to be moderated by firm-specific characteristics,
including sales growth, number of employees, CEO tenure,
and, to a lesser degree, differentiation strategies of the firm.
Moreover, our results indicate that, in addition to Tobin’s q,
CMO presence has a positive impact on excess stock
returns (i.e., Jensen’s a). In contrast, CMO presence does
not seem to have a direct impact on a firm’s sales growth.
We note that these findings reinforce the importance of the
marketing–finance interface, in that it is only through market–
based measures that the significance of the CMO is
observed.
Beyond the substantive insights, we hope that our
research also makes a methodological contribution to the
broader marketing strategy literature. Modeling phenomena
as complex as the CMO’s performance implications, in our
opinion, requires not only using a diverse set of models but
also careful consideration of the identifying assumptions
underlying these models. Moreover, if the results are sensi-
tive to identifying assumptions (i.e., if different models give
different results), researchers should discuss the identifying
assumptions and speculate on why the findings might be
sensitive to these assumptions.
Here, we find that the positive effect of CMO presence
on Tobin’s q is consistent across a diverse set of models,
each with different identifying assumptions. Given these
convergent findings, our confidence in the identified posi-
tive and significant CMO effect on Tobin’s q is high. We
also find that the positive effect of CMO presence on firm
idiosyncratic risk only manifests in the 2SLSRE model. We
believe that we have made a strong case for our choice of
IV, namely, CMO prevalence among peer firms; in addition,
the Hausman test suggests that CMO presence is endoge-
nous. Thus, it is possible that the nonfindings for idiosyn-
cratic risks using the other models suffer from an endogene-
ity bias, but the 2SLSRE model corrects for that bias.
However, because the CMO effect is not significant in the
random-effects with control function model, our other IV
model, we cannot conclude with high certainty that CMO
presence indeed has a positive effect on idiosyncratic risk.
We hope that researchers will further explore the CMO’s
impact on firm risk. For example, a potentially fruitful
study might entail reassessing the control variables we
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include in the risk model, followed by identifying addi-
tional control variables, and then reestimating the various
models. Indeed, we used the same control variables in the
risk model as we did in the Tobin’s q and sales growth
model, which we adopted from N&M. However, N&M
developed their model with Tobin’s q and sales growth as
the dependent variables, and not risk. Therefore, it is possi-
ble that our risk model excludes important control
variables.
Limitations
Although we believe that we have broken new ground with
this work, there are clear limitations, some of which pro-
vide fruitful avenues for further research and discussion.
First, simply adding a CMO to the TMT will most likely not
improve the performance of a firm; rather, the positive
effect that we observe in our study likely derives from the
role of marketing in our sample firms. Webster, Malter, and
Ganesan (2003), for example, suggest that CMO presence
is a credible signal that the firm is likely to appreciate the
marketing concept, and N&M propose that CMO presence
is an indicator of marketing’s influence in the firm. Thus, if
firms employ a CMO, marketing is likely to play a more
prominent role in the firm, and that could be the source of
the performance effects we find. We note that the role of
marketing in the firm should, of course, be heavily influ-
enced by the CMO. Further research could examine
whether this prediction holds and, for example, attempt to
measure a firm’s market orientation (by means of, e.g., con-
tent analyzing annual reports [e.g., Noble, Sinha, and
Kumar 2002]) and then analyze whether market orientation
mediates the CMO’s positive impact on firm performance.
Second, as we mentioned previously, our insights
regarding the CMO’s effect on idiosyncratic risk are limited
given the lack of convergent findings. We hope that future
studies will further explore the CMO’s impact on firm risk.
Third, our results are based on larger firms (i.e., firms with
more than $250 million in sales) that invest in both R&D
and advertising. We do not find a significant correlation
between firm size and CMO presence. Thus, we believe
that our results should hold even for smaller firms, although
extrapolation outside the data range on which the models
were estimated should be done with caution. However, our
results should not be generalized to firms that do not invest
in advertising and R&D.
Conclusion
Many CMOs struggle to prove their worth to other mem-
bers of their top management team. Perhaps accordingly,
the average tenure of a CMO is estimated to be two years,
compared with five years for CEOs (e.g., N&M). Against
this backdrop, there have been strong calls among acade-
mics and practitioners alike to shed more light on the per-
formance implications of CMO presence (e.g., Boyd,
Chandy, and Cunha 2010). The key finding of our study is
that firms seem to benefit from having a CMO among the
TMT; we hope that this seemingly robust finding will help
cement the presence of a CMO at the strategy table.
17To arrive at these performance gain estimates, we computed
two predicted values of Tobin’s q, one for firms with a CMO and
one for those without a CMO, using the coefficients from Model 5
(e.g., bCMO = .17) and setting the other independent variables at
their sample mean. We then calculated the percentage difference
between the two predicted values.
Appendix: Simulation Study:
Within-Firm CMO Variability
We conducted a simple simulation study to investigate the
impact of various degrees of within-firm CMO variability
on four of the estimators that we use—namely, the OLS,
between-effects, fixed-effects, and random-effects estima-
tors. We consider the following data-generating model in
our simulation:
(A1)                   yit = b0i + b1CMOit + b2Xit + it,
where yit is the dependent variable (e.g., Tobin’s q), CMOit
is 1 if firm i has a CMO in time period t and 0 otherwise,
and Xit is an exogenous regressor that varies across firms
and over time. We do not consider endogeneity here and
treat both CMOit and Xit as exogenous. The parameter b0i is
a random intercept that varies across i. We set the true
parameters as follows: b1 = 1, b2 = –1, and the regressor Xit
is independent and normally distributed across i and t with
mean 0 and variance 1 and has a small correlation (multi-
collinearity) with CMOit of .2. The error terms b0i and it
are i.i.d. from a normal distribution, with E(b0i) = 10 and E(it) = 0, and variances s2b and s2, respectively. The error
terms represent the unobserved between-firm variation (b0i)
and unobserved within-firm variation (it). We change the
ratio of the two variances of the error terms to represent sit-
uations in which there is relatively more within (s2 > s2b)
versus between (s2b > s2) unobserved variation. We use the
same sample size as in our empirical application (i.e., Sam-
ple 4: 155 firms and 12 time periods).
We generate the CMO variable as follows: With proba-
bility p, the firm has a CMO for all time periods, and with
probability q, the firm switches its CMO status one time
during the 12-year observation period (we note that several
of our sample firms switch CMO status more than once dur-
ing the 12 years; however, to be conservative, we assume
that firms switch CMO status at most one time in this simu-
lation study). We randomly decide (with equal probabili-
ties) in which time period the firm changes its CMO status.
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For example, if a firm changes its CMO status during the
fifth year, we could observe the following scenario:
000010000000 (i.e., a CMO is present in the fifth year but
not in years 1–4 and years 6–12). We set p equal to the
observed CMO prevalence in our empirical application
(~.4) and vary q in 20 steps from .05 to 1 (i.e., in increments
of .05). We did not include q = 0 because the fixed-effects
estimator for CMO would not be identified in that case.
We consider the following three scenarios regarding
between versus within unobserved variation:
1. s2 = 1 and s2b = 1 (relatively equal within and between
unobserved variation),
2. s2 = 1.5 and s2b = .5 (relatively more within unobserved
variation), and
3. s2 = .5 and s2b = 1.5 (relatively more between unobserved
variation).
Thus, we have a total of 20 ¥ 3 = 60 experimental con-
ditions. For each experimental condition, we generate 100
data sets using Model A1 and estimate b1 with OLS,
between-effects, fixed-effects, and random-effects. We ana-
lyzed the root mean square error (RMSE) and the bias of
the estimated CMO effect for each estimator.
Figures A1 and A2 summarize our findings for Scenario
1 (we only report detailed results based on Scenario 1 here
but note that the pattern of results based on Scenarios 2 and
3 were similar; detailed results are available from the
authors).18 As Figure A1 shows, the RMSE of the fixed-
FIGURE A1
RMSE Based on Scenario 1: s2 = 1 and s2b = 1
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Notes: Between = between-effects model; FE = fixed-effects model;
RE = random-effects model.
FIGURE A2
BIAS Based on Scenario 1: s2 = 1 and s2b = 1
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Notes: Between = between-effects model; FE = fixed-effects model;
RE = random-effects model.
18For each experimental condition, we generate L = 100 simulated
data sets. For each data set  = 1, …, L, we compute K estimators
for b1 using OLS, between-effects, fixed-effects, and random-effects.
Then, the RMSE for the kth estimator is RMSEk = (1/L)SL = 1(b̂k1 –
b1)2, where b̂k1 is the estimate of the CMO effect of the kth esti-
mator (e.g., the FE estimator) in the th simulated data, and b1 is
the true value of the CMO effect used in the simulation study to
generate the data. Similarly, BIASk = [(1/L)SL = 1b̂k1] – b1. A good
estimator has a bias of 0 and a low RMSE; the best estimator here
has the lowest RMSE.
effects estimator is largest for small values of q; that is,
when most firms (up to approximately q = 15%) do not
change CMO status across the 12 time periods. However,
when approximately 20% of the firms change CMO status
once during the 12 time periods, the between-effects esti-
mator has the largest RMSE. For Scenarios 2 and 3 (results
not shown), we find similar patterns: the fixed-effects esti-
mator has the largest RMSE for values of q up to 45% and
10%, respectively. Notably, the random-effects estimator
always has the lowest RMSE, and OLS always has a lower
RMSE than the between-effects estimator. Moreover, Fig-
ure A2 shows that, across all values of q,  the CMO effect is
estimated in an approximately unbiased way by all four
estimators. That is, even when only 5% of the firms switch
CMO status once, we still obtain an approximately unbi-
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ased estimate of the CMO effect (Scenarios 2 and 3 yielded
almost identical results).
In our empirical application (considering Sample 4), 37%
of the firms do not switch CMO status and 63% of the firms
switch CMO status once or more. In our simulation study,
the fixed-effects, random-effects, and (to a lesser degree)
OLS estimators always behave well for levels of q > 60%.
The between-effects estimator, however, has a fairly high
RMSE for all levels of q. Whether fixed-effects, random-
effects, and OLS estimators are more or less efficient than
between-effects estimators in the end is an empirical ques-
tion. However, our simulation results indicate that fixed-
effects, random-effects, and OLS estimators indeed seem to
be more efficient than the between-effects estimator given
the context of our CMO study.
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